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Natural language elements in source code, e.g., the names of variables and functions, convey useful information.
However, most existing bug detection tools ignore this information and therefore miss some classes of bugs.
The few existing name-based bug detection approaches reason about names on a syntactic level and rely on
manually designed and tuned algorithms to detect bugs. This paper presents DeepBugs, a learning approach
to name-based bug detection, which reasons about names based on a semantic representation and which
automatically learns bug detectors instead of manually writing them. We formulate bug detection as a binary
classification problem and train a classifier that distinguishes correct from incorrect code. To address the
challenge that effectively learning a bug detector requires examples of both correct and incorrect code, we
create likely incorrect code examples from an existing corpus of code through simple code transformations. A
novel insight learned from our work is that learning from artificially seeded bugs yields bug detectors that are
effective at finding bugs in real-world code. We implement our idea into a framework for learning-based and
name-based bug detection. Three bug detectors built on top of the framework detect accidentally swapped
function arguments, incorrect binary operators, and incorrect operands in binary operations. Applying the
approach to a corpus of 150,000 JavaScript files yields bug detectors that have a high accuracy (between 89%
and 95%), are very efficient (less than 20 milliseconds per analyzed file), and reveal 102 programming mistakes
(with 68% true positive rate) in real-world code.
1 INTRODUCTION
Source code written by humans contains valuable natural language information, such as the identi-
fier names of variables and functions. This information often conveys insights into the semantics
intended by the developer, and therefore is crucial for human program understanding [Butler et al.
2010; Lawrie et al. 2006]. While the importance of identifier names for humans is widely recognized,
program analyses typically ignore most or even all identifier names. For example, popular static
analysis tools, such as Google Error Prone [Aftandilian et al. 2012] , FindBugs [Hovemeyer and
Pugh 2004], or lgtm1, mostly ignore identifier names. As a result, analyzing a program that has
meaningful identifiers chosen by human developers yields the same results as analyzing a variant
of the program where identifiers are consistently replaced with arbitrary and meaningless names.
Ignoring identifier names causes existing bug detection tools to miss bugs that, in hindsight, may
appear obvious to a human. Table 1 gives three examples of such bugs. All three are from real-world
code written in JavaScript, a language where identifiers are particularly important due to the lack
of static types. Example 1 shows a bug in Angular.js where the developer accidentally passes two
function arguments in the wrong order. The first expected argument is a callback function, but
the second argument is called fn, an abbreviation for “function”. Example 2 shows a bug in the
Angular-UI-Router project where the developer compares two values of incompatible types with
each other. In the absence of statically declared types, this inconsistency can be spotted based on the
unusual combination of identifier names. Finally, Example 3 shows a bug in the DSP.js library where
the developer accidentally swapped the operands of a binary operation inside a loop. A human
might detect this bug knowing that i is a common name for a loop variable, which suggests that
1https://lgtm.com/
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Table 1. Examples of name-related bugs detected by DeepBugs.
ID Buggy code Description
1
browserSingleton.startPoller (100,
function(delay , fn) {
setTimeout(delay ,fn);
});
The setTimeout function expects two
arguments: a callback function and
the number of milliseconds after
which to invoke the callback. The
code accidentally passes these argu-
ments in the inverse order.
2
for (j = 0; j < param.replace; j++) {
if (param.replace[j].from === paramVal)
paramVal = param.replace[j].to;
}
The header of the for-loop com-
pares the index variable j to
the array param.replace. Instead,
the code should compare j to
param.replace.length.
3
for(var i = 0; i<this.NR_OF_MULTIDELAYS; i++){
// Invert the signal of every even multiDelay
outputSamples = mixSampleBuffers(outputSamples ,
this.multiDelays[i]. process(filteredSamples),
2%i==0, this.NR_OF_MULTIDELAYS);
/* ^^^^^^ */
}
The highlighted expression 2%i==0
is supposed to alternate between
true and false while traversing the
loop. However, the code accidentally
swapped the operands and should in-
stead be i%2==0.
the code does not match the intended semantics. As illustrated by these examples, identifier names
convey valuable information that can help to detect otherwise missed programming mistakes.
One reason why most program analyses, including bug detection tools, ignore identifier names
is that reasoning about them is hard. Specifically, there are two challenges for a name-based bug
detector. First, a name-based analysis must reason about the meaning of identifier names. As a
form of natural language information, identifier names are inherently fuzzy and elude the precise
reasoning that is otherwise common in program analysis. Second, given an understanding of the
meaning of identifier names, an analysis must decide whether a given piece of code is correct or
incorrect. To be practical as a bug detection tool, the second challenge must be addressed in a way
that yields a reasonably low number of false positives while detecting actual bugs.
Previous work on name-based bug detection [Høst and Østvold 2009; Liu et al. 2016; Pradel and
Gross 2011; Rice et al. 2017] addresses these challenges by lexically reasoning about identifiers
and through manually designed algorithms. To reason about the meaning of identifiers, these
approaches use lexical similarities of names as a proxy for semantic similarity. For example, the
existing approaches may find length and len to be similar because they share a common substring,
but miss the fact that length and count are semantically similar even though they are lexically
different. To make decisions about programs, e.g., to report a piece of code as likely incorrect,
existing name-based analyses rely on manually designed algorithms that use hard-coded patterns
and carefully tuned heuristics. For example, a name-based analysis that has been recently deployed
at Google [Rice et al. 2017] comes with various heuristics to increase the number of detected bugs
and to decrease the number of false positives. Designing and fine-tuning such heuristics imposes a
significant human effort that is difficult to reuse across different analyses and different classes of
bugs.
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This paper tackles the problem of name-based bug detection with a machine learning-based
approach. To address the problem of reasoning about the meaning of identifiers, we use a learned
vector representation of identifiers. This representation, called embeddings, preserves semantic
similarities, such as the fact that length and count are similar. Such embeddings have been successful
for several natural language processing tasks and adopting them to source code is a natural choice
for name-based bug detection. To address the problem of deciding whether a piece of code is
likely correct or incorrect, we formulate the problem as binary classification and train a model to
distinguish correct from incorrect code. Because the classifier is learnedwithout human intervention,
the approach does not rely on designing and tuning heuristics.
Effectively learning a classifier that distinguishes correct from incorrect code requires training
data that consists of both correct and incorrect examples. Examples of correct code are easily
available due to the huge amounts of existing code, based in the common assumption that most
parts of most code are correct. In contrast, large amounts of code examples that are incorrect for a
specific reason are much harder to find. In particular, manually obtaining a sufficiently large data
set would require a human to label thousands of bugs. To address this problem, we generate large
amounts of training data via simple program transformations that insert likely bugs into existing,
supposedly correct code. An important insight of our work is that learning from such artificially
generated training data yields a learned model that is effective at identifying real-world bugs.
We implement our ideas into an extensible framework, called DeepBugs, that supports different
classes of name-related bugs. The framework extracts positive training examples from a code
corpus, applies a simple transformation to also create large amounts of negative training examples,
trains a model to distinguish these two, and finally uses the trained model for identifying mistakes
in previously unseen code. We present three bug detectors based on DeepBugs that find acciden-
tally swapped function arguments, incorrect binary operators, and incorrect operands in binary
operations. Creating a new bug detector consists of two simple steps. First, provide a training data
generator that extracts correct and incorrect code examples from a given corpus of code. Second,
map each code example into a vector that the machine learning model learns to classify as correct
or incorrect. For the second step, all bug detectors reuse the same embedding of identifier names,
simplifying the task of creating a name-based bug detector.
Our approach differs from existing bug detectors that identify bugs as anomalies in a corpus
of code [Engler et al. 2001; Hangal and Lam 2002; Monperrus et al. 2010]. These approaches infer
information from existing code by learning only from correct examples and then flag any code as
unusual that deviates from the norm. To reduce false positives, those approaches typically filter
the detected anomalies based on manually designed heuristics. Instead, our approach learns from
positive and negative examples, enabling the machine learning model to accurately distinguish
these two classes. DeepBugs differs from existing work on name-based bug detection [Høst and
Østvold 2009; Liu et al. 2016; Pradel and Gross 2011; Rice et al. 2017] by reasoning about identifiers
based on a semantic representation, by learning bug detectors instead of manually writing them,
and by considering two new name-related bug patterns on top of the previously considered swapped
function arguments [Liu et al. 2016; Pradel and Gross 2011; Rice et al. 2017]. Finally, our work is
the first on name-based bug detection for dynamically typed languages, where name-related bugs
may remain unnoticed due to the lack of static type checking.
We evaluate DeepBugs and its three instantiations by learning from a corpus of 100,000 JavaScript
files and by searching mistakes in another 50,000 JavaScript files. In total, the corpus amounts to 68
million lines of code. We find that the learned bug detectors have an accuracy between 89% and
95%, i.e., they are very effective at distinguishing correct from incorrect code. Manually inspecting
a subset of the warnings reported by the bug detectors, we found 102 real-world bugs and code
quality problems among 150 inspected. Even though we do not perform any manual tuning or
3
Corpus of code
setSize(width, height)
Positive examples
setSize(width, height)
Negative examples
setSize(height, width)
Vector representations
(0.37, -0.87, 0.04, ..)
(-0.13., 0.63, 0.38, ..)
Learned
bug detector
Previously unseen code
setDim(y_dim, x_dim)
Vector representations
(-0.12, 0.67, 0.35, ..)
Likely bugs and code
quality problems
Incorrectly ordered arguments?
setDim(y_dim, x_dim)
(1) Training
data generator
(2) Embeddings
for identifiers
(3) Train
classifier(4) Embeddings
for identifiers
(5) Query
classifier (6) Predict
Fig. 1. Overview of our approach.
filtering of warnings, the bug detectors have a reasonable precision of 68%, i.e., the majority of the
reported warnings point to actual bugs.
In summary, this paper contributes the following:
• A learning approach to name-based bug detection, which differs from previous name-based
bug detectors (i) by reasoning about identifier names based on a semantic representation, (ii)
by learning bug detectors instead of manually writing them, (iii) by considering additional
bug patterns, and (iv) by targeting a dynamically typed programming language.
• We formulate bug detection as a classification problem and present a framework to learn a
classifier from examples of correct and incorrect code. To obtain large amounts of training
data for both classes, we create training data through simple program transformations that
yield likely incorrect code.
• We implement the idea into a general framework that can be instantiated into different kinds
of name-based bug detectors. The framework is available as open-source, enabling others to
build on our work, e.g., by adding further bug detectors:
https://github.com/michaelpradel/DeepBugs
• We provide empirical evidence that the approach yields effective bug detectors that find
various bugs in real-world JavaScript code.
2 A FRAMEWORK FOR LEARNING TO FIND NAME-RELATED BUGS
This section presents the DeepBugs framework for automatically creating name-based bug detectors
via machine learning. The basic idea is to train a classifier to distinguish between code that is an
instance of a name-related bug pattern and code that does not suffer from this bug pattern. By bug
pattern, we informally mean a class of programming errors that are similar because they violate
the same rule. For example, accidentally swapping the arguments passed to a function, calling
the wrong API method, or using the wrong binary operator are bug patterns. Manually written
bug checkers, such as FindBugs or Error Prone, are also based on bug patterns, each of which
corresponds to a separately implemented analysis.
2.1 Overview
Given a corpus of code, creating and using a bug detector based on DeepBugs consists of several
steps. Figure 1 illustrates the process with a simple example.
(1) Extract and generate training data from the corpus. This step statically extracts positive,
i.e., likely correct, code examples from the given corpus and generates negative, i.e., likely
incorrect, code examples. Because we assume that most code in the corpus is correct, the
extracted positive code examples are likely to not suffer from the particular bug pattern. To
also create negative training examples, DeepBugs applies simple code transformations that
are likely to introduce a bug. (Step 1 in Figure 1.)
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(2) Represent code as vectors. This step translates each code example into a vector. To preserve
semantic information conveyed by identifier names, we learn an embedding that maps
identifiers to a semantic vector representation via a Word2Vec neural network [Mikolov et al.
2013b]. (Step 2 in Figure 1.)
(3) Train a model to distinguish correct and incorrect examples. Given two sets of code that contain
positive and negative examples, respectively, this step trains a classifier to distinguish between
the two kinds of examples. The classifier is a feedforward neural network. (Step 3 in Figure 1.)
(4) Predict bugs in previously unseen code. This step applies the classifier obtained in the previous
step to predict whether a previously unseen piece of code suffers from the bug pattern. If the
learned model classifies the code to be likely incorrect, the approach reports a warning to
the developer. (Steps 4 to 6 in Figure 1.)
The example in Figure 1 illustrates these steps for a bug detector aimed at finding incorrectly
ordered function arguments. In Step 6, the bug detector warns about a likely bug where the
arguments y_dim and x_dim should be swapped. The reason that the approach can spot such bugs is
that the trained classifier generalizes beyond the training data based on the semantic representation
of identifiers. For the example, the representation encodes that width and x_dim, as well as height
and y_dim, are pairwise semantically similar, enabling DeepBugs to detect the bug.
2.2 Generating Training Data
An important prerequisite for any learning-based approach is a sufficiently large amount of training
data. In this work, we formulate the problem of bug detection as a binary classification task and
address it via supervised learning. To effectively address this task, our approach relies on training
data for both classes, i.e., examples of both correct and incorrect code. As observed by others [Bielik
et al. 2016; Nguyen and Nguyen 2015; Raychev et al. 2015], the huge amount of existing code
provides ample of examples of likely correct code. In contrast, it is non-trivial to obtain many
examples of code that suffers from a particular bug pattern. One possible approach is to manually
or semi-automatically search code repositories and bug trackers for examples of bugs that match a
given bug pattern. However, scaling this approach to thousands or even millions of examples, as
required for advanced machine learning, is extremely difficult.
Instead of relying on manual effort for creating training data, this work generates training
data fully automatically from a given corpus of code. The key idea is to apply a simple code
transformation τ that transforms likely correct code extracted from the corpus into likely incorrect
code. Section 3 presents implementations of τ that apply simple AST-based code transformations.
Definition 2.1 (Training data generator). Let C ⊆ L be a set of code in a programming language
L. Given a piece of code c ∈ C , a training data generator G : C → (2Cpos , 2Cneд ) creates two sets
of code snippets Cpos ⊆ C and Cneд ⊆ L, which contain positive and negative training examples,
respectively. The negative examples are created by applying transformation τ : C → C to each
positive example: Cneд = {cneд | cneд = τ (cpos ) ∀cpos ∈ Cpos }
By code snippet we mean a single expression, a single statement, or multiple related statements.
Each code snippet contains enough information to determine whether it contains a bug. For example,
a code snippet can be a call expression with two arguments, which enables a bug detector to decide
whether the arguments are passed in the correct order.
There are various ways to implement a training data generator. For example, suppose the bugs
of interest are accidentally swapped arguments of function calls. A training data generator for
this bug pattern gathers positive examples by extracting all function calls that have at least two
arguments and negative examples by permuting the order of these arguments of the function calls.
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Under the assumption that the given code is mostly correct, the original calls are likely correct,
whereas changing the order of arguments is likely to provide an incorrect call.
Our idea of artificially creating likely incorrect code relates to mutation testing [Jia and Harman
2011] and to work on artificially introducing security vulnerabilities [Dolan-Gavitt et al. 2016;
Pewny and Holz 2016]. These existing techniques are intended for evaluating the effectiveness of
test suites and of vulnerability detection tools, respectively. Our work differs by creating likely
incorrect code for a different purpose, training a machine learning model, and by considering bug
patterns that are amenable to name-based bug detection.
2.3 Embeddings for Identifiers and Literals
As machine learning relies on vector representations of the analyzed data, to learn a bug detector,
we require vector representations of code snippets. An important challenge for a name-based bug
detector, is to reason about identifier names, which are natural language information and therefore
inherently difficult to understand for a computer. Our goal is to distinguish semantically similar
identifiers from dissimilar ones. For example, the bug detector that searches for swapped arguments
may learn from examples such as done(error, result) that done(res, err) is likely to be wrong,
because error ≈ err and result ≈ res, where ≈ refers to semantic similarity. In contrast, seq and
sequoia are semantically dissimilar because they refer to different concepts, even though they
share a common prefix of characters. As illustrated by these examples, semantic similarity does
not always correspond to lexical similarity, as considered by prior work [Liu et al. 2016; Pradel
and Gross 2011; Rice et al. 2017], and may even exist cross type boundaries. To enable a machine
learning-based bug detector to reason about identifiers, we require a representation of identifiers
that preserves semantic similarities.
In addition to identifiers, we also consider literals in code, such as true and 23, because they
also convey relevant semantic information that can help to detect bugs. For example, true and 1
are similar (in JavaScript, at least) because both evaluate to true when being used in a conditional.
To simplify the presentation, we say “identifier” to denote both identifiers and literals. Our imple-
mentation disambiguates tokens that represent identifiers and literals from each other and from
language keywords by prepending the former with “ID:” and the latter with “LIT:”.
DeepBugs reasons about identifiers by automatically learning a vector representation, called
embeddings, for each identifier based on a corpus of code:
Definition 2.2 (Embeddings). The embeddings are a map E : I → Re that assigns to each identifier
in the set I of identifiers a real-valued vector in an e-dimensional space.
A naïve representation is a local, or one-hot, encoding, where e = |I | and where each vector
returned by E contains only zeros except for a single element that is set to one and that represents
the specific identifier. Such a local representation fails to provide two important properties. First, to
enable efficient learning, we require an embedding that stores many identifiers in relatively short
vectors. Second, to enable DeepBugs to generalize across non-identical but semantically similar
identifiers, we require an embedding that assigns a similar vector to semantically similar identifiers.
Instead of a local embedding, we use a distributed embedding, where the information about an
identifier is distributed across all elements of the vector returned by E. Our distributed embedding
is inspired by word embeddings for natural languages, specifically by Word2Vec [Mikolov et al.
2013a]. The basic idea of Word2Vec is that the meaning of a word can be derived from the various
contexts in which this word is used. In natural languages, the context of an occurrence of a word
in a sequence of words is the window of words preceding and succeeding the word.
We adapt this idea to source code by viewing code as a sequence of tokens and by defining the
context of the occurrence of an identifier as its immediately preceding and succeeding tokens. Given
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Table 2. Examples of identifier names and literals extracted for name-based bug detectors.
Expression Extracted name
list ID:list
23 LIT:23
this LIT:this
i++ ID:i
myObject.prop ID:prop
myArray[5] ID:myArray
nextElement() ID:nextElement
db.allNames()[3] ID:allNames
a sequence of tokens t1, ..., ti , ..., tk , where ti is an identifier, the approach considers a window of
w tokens around ti , containing the w2 tokens before ti and the
w
2 tokens after ti . As a default, we
choosew = 20 in our experiments.
We use the CBOW variant of Word2Vec [Mikolov et al. 2013a], which trains a neural network
that predicts a token from its surrounding tokens. To achieve this goal, the network feeds the given
information through a hidden layer of size e , from which the token is predicted. We use e = 200 for
our experiments. Once trained, the network has learned a semantics-preserving representation of
each identifier, and we use this representation as the embedding E of the identifier.
For efficiency during training, we limit the vocabulary V of tokens, including identifiers and
literals, to |V | = 10, 000 by discarding the least frequent tokens. To represent tokens beyond V , we
use a placeholder “unknown”. Section 5.7 shows that this way of bounding the vocabulary size
covers the vast majority of all occurrences of identifiers and literals.
2.4 Vector Representations of Positive and Negative Code Examples
Given code snippets extracted from a corpus, our approach uses the embeddings for identifiers to
represent each snippet as a vector suitable for learning:
Definition 2.3 (Code representation). Given a code snippet c ∈ C , its code representation v ∈ Rn
is an n-dimensional real-valued vector that contains the embeddings of all identifiers in c .
Each bug detector built on top of the DeepBugs framework chooses a code representation suitable
for the specific kind of code snippet (explained in detail in Section 3). For example, to detect bugs
related to function arguments, the code representation may contain the embeddings of the function
name and the arguments.
All bug detectors share the same technique for extracting names of expressions. Given an AST
node n that represents an expression, we extract name(n) as follows:
• If n is an identifier, return its name.
• If n is a literal, return a string representation of its value.
• If n is a this expression, return “this”.
• If n is an update expression that increments or decrements x , return name(x).
• If n is a member expression base .prop that accesses a property, return name(prop).
• If n is a member expression base[k] that accesses an array element, return name(base).
• If n is a call expression base .callee(..), return name(callee).
• For any other AST node n, do not extract its name.
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Table 2 gives examples of names extracted from JavaScript expressions. We use the prefixes “ID:”
and “LIT:” to distinguish identifiers and literals. The extraction technique is similar to that used
in manually created name-based bug detectors [Liu et al. 2016; Pradel and Gross 2011; Rice et al.
2017], but omits heuristics to make the extracted name suitable for a lexical comparison of names.
For example, existing techniques remove common prefixes, such as get to increase the lexical
similarity between, e.g., getNames and names. Instead, DeepBugs identifies semantic similarities of
names through learned embeddings.
2.5 Training andQuerying a Bug Detector
Based on the vector representation of code snippets, a bug detector is a model that distinguishes
between vectors that correspond to correct and incorrect code examples, respectively.
Definition 2.4 (Bug detector). A bug detector D is a binary classifier D : C → [0, 1] that predicts
the probability that a code snippet c ∈ C is an instance of a particular bug pattern.
Training a bug detector consists of two steps. At first, DeepBugs computes for each positive
example cpos ∈ Cpos its vector representationvpos ∈ Rn , which yields a setVpos of vectors. Likewise,
the approach computes the set Vneд from the negative examples cneд ∈ Cneд . Then, we train the
bug detector D in a supervised manner by providing two kinds of input-output pairs: (vpos , 0) and
(vneд , 1). The output of the learned model can be interpreted as the probability that the given code
snippet is incorrect. That is, the model is trained to predict that positive code examples are correct
and that negative code examples are incorrect.
In principle, a bug detector can be implemented by any classification technique. We use a
feedforward neural network with an input layer of a size that depends on the code representation
provided by the specific bug detector, a single hidden layer of size 200, and an output layer with a
single element that represents the probability computed by D. We apply a dropout of 0.2 to the
input layer and the hidden layer. As the loss function, we use binary cross-entropy and train the
network with the RMSprop optimizer for 10 epochs with batch size 100.
Given a sufficiently large set of training data, the bug detector will generalize beyond the training
examples and one can query it with previously unseen code. To this end, DeepBugs extracts
code snippets Cnew in the same way as extracting the positive training data. For example, for a
bug detector that identifies swapped function arguments, the approach extracts all function calls
including their unmodified arguments. Next, DeepBugs computes the vector representation of
each example cnew ∈ Cnew , which yields a set Vnew . Finally, we query the trained bug detector
D with every vnew ∈ Vnew and obtain for each code snippet a prediction of the probability that
it is incorrect. To report warnings about bugs the a developer, DeepBugs ranks all warnings by
the predicted probability in descending order. In addition, one can control the overall number of
warnings by omitting all warnings with a probability below a configurable threshold.
It is important to note that bug detectors built with DeepBugs do not require any heuristics or
manually designed filters of warnings, as commonly used in existing name-based bug detectors [Liu
et al. 2016; Pradel and Gross 2011; Rice et al. 2017]. For example, the start-of-the-art bug detector to
detect accidentally swapped function arguments relies on a hard-coded list of function names for
which swapping the arguments is expected, such as flip, transpose, or reverse [Rice et al. 2017].
Instead of hard-coding such heuristics, which is time-consuming and likely incomplete, learned
name-based bug detectors infer these kinds of exceptions from the training data.
3 NAME-BASED BUG DETECTORS
This section presents three examples of name-based bug detectors built on top of the DeepBugs
framework. The bug detectors address a diverse set of programming mistakes: accidentally swapped
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function arguments, incorrect binary operators, and incorrect operands in binary expressions.While
the first bug pattern has been the target of previous work for statically typed languages [Liu et al.
2016; Pradel and Gross 2011; Rice et al. 2017], we are not aware of a name-based bug detector for
the other two bug patterns. Implementing new bug detectors is straightforward, and we envision
future work to create more instances of our framework, e.g., based on bug patterns mined from
version histories [Brown et al. 2017; Hanam et al. 2016].
Each bug detector consists of two simple ingredients.
• Training data generator. A training data generator that traverses the code corpus and extracts
positive and negative code examples for the particular bug pattern based on a code trans-
formation (Definition 2.1). We find a simple AST-based traversal and transformation to be
sufficient for all studied bug patterns.
• Code representation. A mapping of each code example into a vector that the machine learning
model learns to classify as either benign or buggy (Definition 2.3). All bug detectors presented
here build on the same embeddings of identifier names, allowing us to amortize the one-time
effort of learning an embedding across different bug detectors.
Given these two ingredients and a corpus of training code, our framework learns a bug detector
that identifies programming mistakes in previously unseen code.
The remainder of this section presents three bug detectors build on top of DeepBugs.
3.1 Swapped Function Arguments
The first bug detector addresses accidentally swapped arguments. This kind of mistake can occur
both in statically typed and dynamically typed languages. For statically typed languages, this kind
of bug occurs for methods that accept multiple equally typed arguments. For dynamically typed
languages, the problem is potentially more widespread because all calls that pass two or more
arguments are susceptible to the mistake due to the lack of static type checking. Example 1 in
Table 1 shows a real-world example of this bug pattern.
Training Data Generator. To create training examples from given code, the approach traverses
the AST of each file in the code corpus and visits each call site that has two or more arguments.
For each such call site, the approach extracts the following information:
• The name ncallee of the called function.
• The names narд1 and narд2 of the first and second argument.
• The name nbase of the base object if the call is a method call, or an empty string otherwise.
• The types tarд1 and tarд2 of the first and second argument for arguments that are literals, or
empty strings otherwise.
• The names nparam1 and nparam2 of the formal parameters of the called function, or empty
strings if unavailable.
All names are extracted using the name function defined in Section 2.4. We resolve function calls
heuristically, as sound static call resolution is non-trivial in JavaScript. If either ncallee , narд1,
or narд2 are unavailable, e.g., because the name function cannot extract the name of a complex
expression, then the approach ignores this call site.
From the extracted information, the training data generator creates for each call site a positive
example
xpos = (nbase ,ncallee ,narд1,narд2, tarд1, tarд2,nparam1,nparam2)
and a negative example
xneд = (nbase ,ncallee ,narд2,narд1, tarд2, tarд1,nparam1,nparam2).
9
That is, to create the negative example, we simply swap the arguments w.r.t. the order in the original
code.
Code representation. To enable DeepBugs to learn from the positive and negative examples, we
transform xpos and xneд from tuples of strings into vectors. To this end, the approach represents
each string in the tuple xpos or xneд as a vector. Each name n is represented as E(n), where E is
the learned embedding from Section 2.3. To represent type names as vectors, we define a function
T that maps each built-in type in JavaScript to a randomly chosen binary vector of length 5. For
example, the type “string” may be represented by a vector T (string) = [0, 1, 1, 0, 0], whereas the
type “number” may be represented by a vector T (number) = [1, 0, 1, 1, 0]. Finally, based on the
vector representation of each element in the tuple xpos or xneд , we compute the code representation
for xpos or xneд as the concatenation the individual vectors.
3.2 Wrong Binary Operator
The next two bug detectors address mistakes related to binary operations. At first, we consider
code that accidentally uses the wrong binary operator, e.g., i <= length instead of i < length.
Such mistakes are hard to find, especially in a dynamically typed language, but identifier names
can provide valuable hints when search these mistakes.
Training Data Generator. The training data generator traverses the AST of each file in the code
corpus and extracts the following information from each binary operation:
• The names nlef t and nr iдht of the left and right operand.
• The operator op of the binary operation.
• The types tlef t and tr iдht of the left and right operand if they are literals, or empty strings
otherwise.
• The kind of AST node kparent and kдrandP of the parent and grand-parent nodes of the AST
node that represents the binary operation.
We extract the (grand-)parent nodes to provide some context about the binary operation to Deep-
Bugs, e.g., whether the operation is part of a conditional or an assignment. If either nlef t or nr iдht
are unavailable, then we ignore the binary operation.
From the extracted information, the approach creates a positive and a negative example:
xpos = (nlef t ,nr iдht ,op, tlef t , tr iдht ,kparent ,kдrandP )
xneд = (nlef t ,nr iдht ,op ′, tlef t , tr iдht ,kparent ,kдrandP )
The operator op ′ , op is a randomly selected binary operator different from the original operator.
For example, given a binary expression i <= length, the approach may create a negative example
i < length or i % length, which is likely to create incorrect code.
Code representation. Similar to the above bug detector, we create a vector representation of each
positive and negative example by mapping each string in the tuple to a vector and by concatenating
the resulting vectors. To map a kind of AST node k to a vector, we use a map K that assigns to each
kind of AST node in JavaScript a randomly chosen binary vector of length 8.
3.3 Wrong Operand in Binary Operation
The final bug detector addresses code that accidentally uses an incorrect operand in a binary
operation. The intuition is that identifier names help to decide whether an operand fits another
given operand and a given binary operator. For example, the bug detector may identify the x
operand in height - x as possibly buggy because the operation was intended to be height - y.
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Training Data Generator. The training data generator extracts the same information as in Sec-
tion 3.2, and then replaces one of the operands with a randomly selected alternative. That is, the
positive example is
xpos = (nlef t ,nr iдht ,op, tlef t , tr iдht ,kparent ,kдrandP )
whereas the negative example is either
xneд = (n′lef t ,nr iдht ,op, t ′lef t , tr iдht ,kparent ,kдrandP )
or
xneд = (nlef t ,n′r iдht ,op, tlef t , t ′r iдht ,kparent ,kдrandP ).
The name and type n′lef t and t
′
lef t (or n
′
r iдht and t
′
r iдht ) are different from those in the positive
example. To create negative examples that a programmer might also create by accident, we use
alternative operands that occur in the same file as the binary operation. For example, given bits
<< 2, the approach may transform it into a negative example bits << next, which is likely to yield
incorrect code.
Code representation. The vector representation of the positive and negative examples is the same
as in Section 3.2.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
The code extraction and generation of training examples is implemented as simple AST traversals
based on the Acorn JavaScript parser.2 The training data generator writes all extracted data into
text files. These files are then read by the implementation of the bug detector, which builds upon the
TensorFlow and Keras frameworks for deep learning.3 The large majority of our implementation is
in the generic framework, whereas the individual bug detectors are implemented in about 100 lines
of code each.
5 EVALUATION
We evaluate DeepBugs by applying it to a large corpus of JavaScript code. Our main research
questions are:
• How effective is the approach at distinguishing correct from incorrect code?
• Does the approach find bugs in production JavaScript code?
• How long does it take to train a model and, once a model has been trained, to predict bugs?
• How useful are the learned embeddings of identifiers compared to a simpler vector represen-
tation?
5.1 Experimental Setup
As a corpus of code, we use 150,000 JavaScript files provided by the authors of earlier work [Raychev
et al. 2016b]. The corpus contains files collected from various open-source projects and has been
cleaned by removing duplicate files. In total, the corpus contains 68.6 million lines of code. We
use 100,000 files for training and the remaining 50,000 files for validation. All experiments are
performed on a single machine with 48 Intel Xeon E5-2650 CPU cores, 64GB of memory, and a
single NVIDIA Tesla P100 GPU.
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Table 3. Statistics on extraction and generation of training data.
Bug detector Examples
Training Validation
Swapped arguments 1,450,932 739,188
Wrong binary operator 4,901,356 2,322,190
Wrong binary operand 4,899,206 2,321,586
5.2 Extraction and Generation of Training Data
Table 3 summarizes the training and validation data that DeepBugs extracts and generates for the
three bug detectors. Each bug detector learns from several millions of examples, which is sufficient
for effective learning. Half of the examples are positive and negative code examples, respectively.
Manually creating this amount of training data, including negative examples, would be impractical,
showing the benefit of our automated data generation approach.
5.3 Warnings in Real-World Code
To evaluate the effectiveness of bug detectors built with DeepBugs, we conduct two sets of experi-
ments. First, reported in the following, we apply the bug detectors to unmodified real-world code
and manually inspect the reported warnings to assess the precision of the learned bug detectors.
Second, reported in Section 5.4, we conduct a large-scale evaluation with hundreds of thousands
of artificially created bugs, which allows us to study the accuracy, recall, and precision of each
learned bug detector.
To study the effectiveness of DeepBugs on real-world code, we train each bug detector with
the 100,000 training files, then apply the trained bug detector to the 50,000 validation files, and
finally inspect code locations that the bug detectors report as potentially incorrect. For the manual
inspection, we sort all reported warnings by the probability that the code as incorrect, as reported
by the classifier, and then inspect the top 50 warnings per bug detector. Based on the inspection,
we classify each warning in one of three categories:
• Bug. A warning points to a bug if the code is incorrect in the sense that it does not result in
the expected runtime behavior.
• Code quality problem. A warning points to a code quality problem if the code yields the
expected runtime behavior but should nevertheless be changed to be less error-prone or be
more efficient. This category includes code that violates widely accepted conventions and
programming rules traditionally checked by static linting tools. Our learned bug detectors
find code quality problems because such problems often correspond to unusual code that
diverges from a common coding idiom.
• False positive. A warning is a false positive in all other cases. If we are unsure about the
intended behavior of a particular code location, we conservatively count it as a false positive.
We also encountered various code examples with misleading identifier names, which we
classify as false positives because the decision whether an identifier is misleading is rather
subjective.
Table 4 summarizes the results of inspecting and classifying warnings. Out of the 150 inspected
warnings, 95 warnings point to bugs and 7 warnings point to a code quality problem, i.e., 68% of all
2https://github.com/ternjs/acorn
3https://www.tensorflow.org/ and https://keras.io/
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Table 4. Results of inspecting and classifying warnings in real-world code.
Bug detector Reported Bugs Code quality False
problem positives
Swapped arguments 50 23 0 27
Wrong binary operator 50 37 7 6
Wrong binary operand 50 35 0 15
Total 150 95 7 48
warnings point to an actual problem. Existing manually created bug detectors typically provide
similar true positives rates, but heavily rely on heuristics to filter likely false positives. We conclude
that our learned name-based bug detectors are effective at finding real-world bugs while providing
high precision.
5.3.1 Examples of Bugs. Many of the detected problems are difficult to detect with a traditional,
name-unaware analysis, because the programming mistake is obvious only when understanding
the intended semantics of the involved identifiers and literals. The three motivating examples in
Table 1 are bugs detected by DeepBugs. We discuss three more representative examples in the
following.
Buggy call of Promise.done. The following code is fromApigee’s JavaScript SDK. The Promise.done
function expects an error followed by a result, but the second call of done passes the arguments the
other way around.
var p = new Promise ();
if (promises === null || promises.length === 0) {
p.done(error , result)
} else {
promises [0]( error , result).then(function(res , err) {
p.done(res , err);
});
}
Meaningless binary operation. The following code from RequireJS is a bug that was found and
fixed independently of us.4 The binary operation ’-’ === 0 is obviously meaningless, as it always
returns false. Instead, the developer intended to write indexOf(’-’) === 0. DeepBugs detects this
problem because it handles literals the same way as identifiers.
if (args [0] && args [0]. indexOf('-' === 0)) {
args = args.slice (1);
}
Buggy call of assertEquals. The following code is from the test suite of the Google Closure library.
The arguments of assertEquals are supposed to be the expected and the actual value of a test
outcome. Swapping the argument leads to an incorrect error message when the test fails, which
makes debugging unnecessarily hard. Google developers consider this kind of mistake a bug [Rice
et al. 2017].
assertEquals(tree.remove('merry '), null);
5.3.2 Examples of Code Quality Problems.
4https://github.com/requirejs/requirejs/issues/700
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Error-prone termination condition. The following code from Phaser.js is correct but using !==,
instead of <, as the termination condition of a for-loop is generally discouraged. The reason is that
the loop risks to run out-of-bounds when the counter is incremented by more than one or assigned
an out-of-bounds value, e.g., by an accidental assignment in the loop body. DeepBugs finds this
problem because most code follows the convention of using < in the termination condition.
for (var i = 0, len = b.length; i !== len; ++i) {
...
}
Error-prone and inefficient logical OR. The following code from the promiscuous library uses
the bitwise OR operator | to compare two boolean values. Unfortunately, using bitwise instead
of logical operators for booleans is known to be inefficient5 and may cause unexpected behavior
for non-boolean operands that are supposed to be coerced into booleans. DeepBugs reports this
problem because the is identifiers suggest two boolean return values, which are usually compared
through a logical operation, such as ||.
transform = value && (is(obj , value) | is(func , value)) && value.then;
5.3.3 Examples of False Positives. We discuss some representative examples of false positives.
Some of them are due to wrapper functions, e.g., Math.max, for which our approach extracts a
generic name, “max”, that does not convey the specific meaning of the value returned by the call
expression. The main reason for false positives, though, are poorly named variable names that lead
to surprisingly looking but correct code. For example, DeepBugs falsely reports a warning claiming
that the each operand in the following statement is wrong:
var cw = cs[i].width + each;
A close inspection of the code reveals that the operand is correct, despite the fact that the name
each may not be an ideal choice for a number added to a width. Another example is the following
comparison of value.length and is:
if (v.isNumber(is) && value.length !== is) {
..
}
Our “wrong binary operand” bug detector reports a warning about the is operand, because this
name is typically used for booleans and comparing a boolean to a value stored in length is very
unusual. Again, close inspection of the code shows it to be correct, though. These false positives
illustrate an inherent limitation of name-based bug detection: Because the approach relies in
reasonable names that are in line with common practice, it may fail when developers choose to
diverge from the norm. Overall, we find these cases to be rare enough to yield a bug detector with
a precision of 68%.
5.4 Accuracy and Recall of Bug Detectors
In the following, we evaluate the accuracy and recall of each bug detector at a large scale based
on automatically seeded bugs. This part of our evaluation complements the manual inspection of
potential real-world bugs (Section 5.3) with an automated assessment based on a large number
of artificially seeded bugs. Informally, accuracy here means how many of all the classification
decisions that the bug detector makes are correct. Recall means how many of all bugs in a corpus
of code that the bug detector finds. To evaluate these metrics, we train each bug detector on the
100,000 training files and then apply it to the 50,000 validation files. For the validation files, we use
5https://jsperf.com/bitwise-logical-and
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Table 5. Accuracy of the bug detectors with random and learned embeddings for identifiers.
Embedding
Random Learned
Swapped arguments 93.88% 94.70%
Wrong binary operator 89.15% 92.21%
Wrong binary operand 84.79% 89.06%
the training data generator to extract correct code examples Cpos and to artificially create likely
incorrect code examplesCneд . We then query the bug detector D with each example c , which yields
a probability D(c) that the example is buggy. Finally, we compute the accuracy is as follows:
accuracy =
|{c | c ∈ Cpos ∧ D(c) < 0.5}| + |{c | c ∈ Cneд ∧ D(c) ≥ 0.5}|
|Cpos | + |Cneд |
The last column of Table 5 shows the accuracy of the bug detectors. The accuracy ranges between
89.06% and 94.70%, i.e., all bug detectors are highly effective at distinguishing correct from incorrect
code examples.
The recall of a bug detector is influenced by how many warnings the detector reports. More
warnings are likely to reveal more bugs, thus increasing recall, but are also more likely to report false
positives. Moreover, in practice, developers are only willing to inspect some number of warnings.
To measure recall, we assume that a developer inspects all warnings where the probability D(c) is
above some threshold. We model this process by turning the bug detector D into a boolean function:
Dt (c) =
{
1 if D(c) > t
0 if D(c) ≤ t
where t is a configurable threshold that controls how many warnings to report. Based on Dt , we
compute recall as follows:
recall =
|{c | c ∈ Cneд ∧ Dt (c) = 1}|
|Cneд |
Furthermore, we measure the number of false positives as follows:
#fps = |{c | c ∈ Cpos ∧ Dt (c) = 1}|
Note that both recall and the number of false positives are estimates based exclusively on
artificially seeded bugs. The recall measure assumes that all seeded bugs are actual bugs that should
be detected. The false positive measure assumes that all of the original code is correct and that each
warning in Cpos should therefore be counted as a false positive. We consider these measures here
because they allow us to evaluate DeepBugs with hundreds of thousands of artificial bugs, which
complements the evaluation with real-world bugs in Section 5.3.
Figure 2 shows the recall of the three bug detectors as a function of the threshold for reporting
warnings. Each plot shows the results for five different thresholds: t ∈ {0.5, ..., 0.9}. As expected, the
recall decreases when the threshold increases, because fewer warnings are reported and therefore
some bugs are missed. The results also show that some bug detectors are more likely than others
to detect a bug, if a bug is present.
Considering more warnings naturally also leads to more false positives. For a threshold of t = 0.5,
the three bug detectors report a total of 116,941 warnings, which corresponds to roughly one
warning per 196 lines of code. In contrast, for a threshold of t = 0.9, the number reduces to 11,292,
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Fig. 2. Recall of the bug detectors with different thresholds t for reporting warnings. Each plot contains data
points obtained with t ∈ {0.5, ..., 0.9}. The data labeled “Learned embedding” corresponds to the DeepBugs
approach.
i.e., roughly one warning per 2,025 lines of code. In practice, we expect developers to inspect only
the top-ranked warnings, as we do in Section 5.3.
5.5 Efficiency
Table 6 shows how long it takes to train a bug detector and to use it to predict bugs in previously
unseen code. The training time consists of the time to gather code examples and of time to train
the classifier. The prediction time also consist of the time to extract code examples and of the time
to query the classifier with each example. Running both training and prediction on all 150,000
files takes between 36 minutes and 73 minutes per bug detector. The average prediction time per
JavaScript file is below 20 milliseconds. We conclude that the training time is reasonable for a
machine learning approach and that, once a bug detector is trained, using it on new code takes
very little time.
5.6 Usefulness of Embeddings
Ourwork distinguishes itself from previous name-based bug detectors by reasoning about identifiers
based on a semantic representation, i.e., the learned embeddings (Section 2.3). We evaluate the
usefulness of learned embeddings both quantitatively and qualitatively.
For the quantitative evaluation, we compare DeepBugs with learned embeddings to a simpler
variant of the approach that uses a baseline vector representation. The baseline assigns to each
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Table 6. Time (min:sec) required for training and using a bug detector across the entire code corpus.
Bug detector Training Prediction
Extract Learn Extract Predict
Swapped arguments 7:46 20:48 2:56 5:10
Wrong bin. operator 2:44 49:47 1:28 8:39
Wrong bin. operand 2:44 56:35 1:28 12:14
ID:name
Simil. Identifier
0.4 ID:names
0.4 ID:getName
0.39 ID:_name
0.39 LIT:Identifier
0.37 ID:fullName
0.36 ID:property
0.35 ID:type
0.34 LIT::
0.34 ID:Identifier
0.34 ID:namespace
ID:wrapper
Simil. Identifier
0.36 ID:wrap
0.36 ID:_wrapped
0.36 ID:wrapInner
0.34 ID:element
0.32 ID:container
0.32 ID:wrapAll
0.31 ID:attribs
0.31 ID:$wrapper
0.3 LIT:rect
0.3 ID:renderer
ID:msg
Simil. Identifier
0.57 ID:message
0.46 ID:error
0.4 LIT:error
0.39 ID:receive
0.39 LIT:msg
0.39 LIT:Error
0.36 ID:alert
0.36 LIT::
0.35 LIT:message
0.34 LIT:log
Fig. 3. Most similar identifiers according to the learned embeddings.
identifier considered by DeepBugs a unique, randomly chosen binary vector of length e , i.e., the
same length as our learned embeddings. We compare the learned embeddings with the baseline
w.r.t. accuracy and recall. Table 5 shows in the “Random” column what accuracy the bug detectors
achieve with the baseline. Compared to the accuracy with the random embeddings, the learned
embeddings yield a more accurate classifier.
Figure 2 compares the recall of the bug detectors with the two embeddings. We find that, for
all three bug detectors, the learned embeddings increase the recall. The reason is that the learned
embeddings enable a bug detector to reason about semantic similarities between syntactically
different code examples, which enables it to learn and predict bugs across similar examples. We
conclude from these results that the learned embeddings improve the effectiveness of DeepBugs.
At the same time, the bug detectors achieve relatively high accuracy and recall even with randomly
created embeddings, showing that the overall approach has value even when no learned embeddings
are available.
For a qualitative assessment of the embeddings, we show for a set of identifiers which other
identifiers are the most similar according to the learned embeddings. Figure 3 shows the ten
most similar identifiers for name, wrapper, and msg. Recall that the “ID:” and “LIT:” prefixes are for
distinguishing identifiers from literals. The similarity scores range between 0 and 1, where 1 means
the maximum similarity.
The examples illustrate three observations. First, the embeddings encode similarities between
abbreviated and non-abbreviated identifiers, e.g., msg and message. This property is useful because
abbreviations are common in source code and often introduce words not found in natural language
documents. Second, the embeddings encode similarities between lexically similar identifiers, e.g.,
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Fig. 4. Number of considered identifier occurrences depending on vocabulary size.
name and getName. Previous work on name-based bug detection relies on traditional string similarity
metrics, e.g,. Levenshtein distance, and on heuristics, such as removing the get prefix, to capture
these similarities. Instead, we here learn the similarities from existing code. Finally and perhaps
most importantly, the embeddings encode semantic similarities between lexically dissimilar iden-
tifiers, such as name and Identifier, or wrapper and container. Overall, we conclude that learned
embeddings encode at least some semantic similarities of identifiers, which helps understand why
a learning approach to name-based bug detection is effective.
5.7 Vocabulary Size
An important parameter of our approach is the size |V | of the vocabulary of tokens considered for
learning embeddings (Section 2.3). Considering a larger vocabulary enables DeepBugs to reason
about more code locations but also increases the resource requirements for learning the embeddings
and risks to reduce accuracy due to very uncommon identifiers for which not enough training
data is available. The total number of unique tokens in the training data set is about 2.4 million,
almost all of which are either identifiers or literals. For our experiments, we set |V | = 10, 000, i.e.,
we consider the 10,000 most frequent tokens and replace all others with an “unknown” placeholder.
The reason why such a relatively small vocabulary size is effective is illustrated in Figure 4. For a
given vocabulary size, the figure shows the number of occurrences of identifiers that are included
in the vocabulary. Note that the horizontal axis uses a logarithmic scale. The figure shows that a
small number of tokens covers a large percentage of the occurrences of tokens. The reason is that
some tokens are very frequent, while others occur extremely rarely. The dashed line is our default
vocabulary size, which covers over 90% of all occurrences of tokens.
6 RELATEDWORK
6.1 Machine learning and Language Models for Code
The recent successes in machine learning have lead to a strong interest in applying machine learning
techniques to programs. Existing approaches address a variety of development tasks, including
code completion based on probabilistic models of code [Bielik et al. 2016; Raychev et al. 2016a,
2014], predicting fixes of compilation errors via neural networks [Bhatia and Singh 2016; Gupta
et al. 2017], and the generation of inputs for fuzz testing via probabilistic, generative language
models [Patra and Pradel 2016] or neural networks [Amodio et al. 2017; Godefroid et al. 2017;
Liu et al. 2017]. Deep neural networks also help recommend API usages [Gu et al. 2016], detect
code clones [White et al. 2016], classify programs into pre-defined categories [Mou et al. 2016],
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and adapt copied-and-pasted code to its surrounding code [Allamanis and Brockschmidt 2017]. A
recent survey discusses more approaches [Allamanis et al. 2017a]. All these approaches exploit
the availability of a large number of examples to learn from, e.g., in the form of publicly available
code repositories, and that source code has regularities even across projects written by different
developers [Hindle et al. 2012]. We also exploit this observation but for a different tasks, bug finding,
than the above work. Another contribution of our work is to augment the training data provided by
the existing code by generating negative training examples through simple code transformations.
Name-based bug detection relates to existing learning-based approaches that consider identifiers.
JSNice [Raychev et al. 2015] and JSNaughty [Vasilescu et al. 2017] address the problem of recovering
meaningful identifiers from minified code, using conditional random fields and statistical machine
translation, respectively. Another approach summarizes code into descriptive names that can
serve, e.g., as method names [Allamanis et al. 2016]. The Naturalize tool suggests more natural
identifiers based on an n-gram model [Allamanis et al. 2014]. Applying such a tool before running
our name-based bug detectors is likely to improve its effectiveness.
A recent graph-based learning approach [Allamanis et al. 2017b] applies gated graph neural
networks to an augmented AST representation of code, and shows that a learned model can predict
how to name a variable and which variable to use in a given context. To learn representations of
code, their approach relies on static type information, which is not available in our setting.
Word embeddings, e.g., Word2Vec approach [Mikolov et al. 2013b], are widely used in natural
language processing, which has inspired our embeddings of identifiers. Other recent work has
proposed embeddings for source code, e.g., for API methods [Nguyen et al. 2017], for terms that
occur both in programs and natural language documentation [Ye et al. 2016], as well as a generic,
AST-based representation of code [Alon et al. 2018]. Our evaluation shows that a learned embedding
is beneficial for the problem of bug detection. Incorporating another embedding of identifiers than
our Word2Vec-based embedding into our framework is straightforward.
6.2 Machine Learning and Language Models for Analyzing Bugs
Even though it has been noted that buggy code stands out compared to non-buggy code [Ray et al.
2016], little work exists on automatically detecting bugs via machine learning. Murali et al. train
a recurrent neural network that probabilistically models sequences of API calls and then use it
for finding incorrect API usages [Murali et al. 2017]. In contrast to DeepBugs, their model learns
from positive examples only and focuses on bug patterns that can be expressed via probabilistic
automata. Bugram detects bugs based on an n-gram model of code. Similar to the above, it learns
only from positive examples.
Choi et al. [je Choi et al. 2017] train a memory neural network [Weston et al. 2014] to classify
whether code may produce a buffer overrun. The VulDeePecker approach [?] trains a neural
network to determine whether a code snippet suffers from specific kinds of vulnerabilities. Their
models learn from positive and negative examples, but the examples are manually created and
labeled. A key insight of our work is that simple code transformations that seed artificial bugs
provide many negative examples, and that learning from these examples yields a classifier that is
effective for real-world code.
Finally, Wang et al. use a deep belief network to find a vector representation of ASTs, which are
used for defect prediction [Wang et al. 2016]. Their approach marks entire files as likely to (not)
contain a bug. However, in contrast to our and other bug finding work, their approach does not
pinpoint the buggy location.
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6.3 Bug Finding
A related line of research is specification mining [Ammons et al. 2002] and the use of mined
specifications to detect unusual and possibly incorrect code [Liang et al. 2016; Pradel et al. 2012;
Wasylkowski and Zeller 2009]. In contrast to our work, these approaches learn only from correct
examples [Hangal and Lam 2002] and then flag any code that is unusual compared to the correct
examples as possibly incorrect, or search for inconsistencies within a program [Engler et al. 2001].
Our work replaces the manual effort of creating and tuning such approaches by learning and does
so effectively by learning from both correct and buggy code examples.
Our name-based bug detectors are motivated by manually created name-based program analy-
ses [Liu et al. 2016; Pradel and Gross 2011; Rice et al. 2017]. The “swapped arguments” bug detector
is inspired by the success of a manually developed and tuned name-based bug detector for this
kind of bug [Rice et al. 2017]. For the other three bug detectors, we are not aware of any existing
approach that addresses these problems based on identifiers. Our work differs from existing name-
based bug detectors (i) by exploiting semantic similarities that may not be obvious to a lexical
comparison of identifiers, (ii) by replacing manually tuned heuristics to improve precision and
recall with automated learning from examples, and (iii) by applying name-based bug detection to a
dynamically typed language.
6.4 Other Related Work
Our idea to create artificial, negative examples to train a binary classifier can be seen as a variant of
noise-contrastive estimation [Gutmann and Hyvärinen 2010]. The novelty is to apply this approach
to programs and to show that it yields effective bug detectors. The code transformations we use to
create negative training examples relate to mutation operators [Jia and Harman 2011]. Additional
mutation operators for name-related bugs, e.g., mined from version histories [Brown et al. 2017],
could be an interesting way to extend DeepBugs with further bug detectors.
To evaluate bug detection tools, automated bug seeding has been proposed. LAVA [Dolan-Gavitt
et al. 2016] and EvilCoder [Pewny and Holz 2016] introduce artificial security bugs into code to
evaluate vulnerability detection tools. Their work differs from ours by focusing on vulnerabilities
instead of name-related bugs and by seeding bugs for a different purpose.
7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper addresses the problem of name-based bug detection through a machine learning-based
approach. Our DeepBugs framework learns bug detectors that distinguish correct from incorrect
code by reasoning about the identifier names involved in the code. The key insights that enable
the approach are (i) that reasoning about identifiers based on a learned, semantic representation
of names is beneficial and (ii) that artificially seeding bugs through simple code transformations
yields accurate bug detectors that are effective also for real-world bugs. In contrast to previous
work on name-based bug detection, we target a dynamically typed language, where names convey
information about the intended semantics of code, which is valuable in the absence of static types.
Applying our framework and three bug detectors built on top of it to a large corpus of code
shows that the bug detectors have an accuracy between 89% and 95%, and that they detect 102
programming mistakes with a true positive rate of 68%. In the long term, we envision our work
to complement manually designed bug detectors by learning from existing code and by replacing
some of the human effort required to create bug detectors with computational effort.
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